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INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the state of Illinois is in the midst of a health care
catastrophe. In fact, Illinois was identified by the American Medical Association (AMA) as one of nineteen states currently experiencing a medical
liability crisis.' The gist of the problem is that medical malpractice insurance premiums are skyrocketing primarily in response to extremely large
jury awards for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases. Consequently, physicians and health care providers are fleeing Illinois in search
of more affordable coverage and leaving Illinois patients bereft of health
care options, as the number and availability of physicians declines.
Alarming statistics evidence this problem. While the average jury
verdict award in Cook County in 1998 was $1.07 million, the average verdict jumped to $4.45 million in 2003.2 Even more astounding is the fact
that the average pain and suffering award in Cook County was $3.12 million in 2003. 3 This trend of growing verdicts, however, is not unique to
Illinois. According to the AMA, the median medical liability award nationwide jumped 110% from 1994 to 2002, exceeding $1 million,4 and in
2001 the average award was $3.9 million.5 According to these statistics,
large awards are increasing in frequency and amount.
The resulting health care crisis leaves no one unaffected. Doctors, who
have spent years developing their practices, establishing reputations in a
community, and studying for an Illinois license are forced to leave their
towns or even the state because the costs of insurance premiums are too
expensive. These costs are especially high for specialists such as obstetricians and neurosurgeons. According to ISMIE Mutual, the largest medical
malpractice insurer in Illinois, liability insurance for these two specializations increased in some cases by more than sixty percent in 2003.6 Doctors
who practice in highly litigious counties such as Cook pay even more in
insurance premiums.7 For example, ISMIE raised the rates on obstetricians

1. American Medical Association, Medical Liability Reform - NOW!, at 4 (Mar.
26, 2004), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/go/mlrnow (last visited Mar. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter Liability Reform] (citing JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IN

PERSONAL INJURY: 2002 ED. (2003)).

2.
Illinois State Medical Society, The Medical Litigation Crisis at 3, available at
http://www.isms.org/realmedicine/info/MedicalLitigationCrisis.pdf (last visited Feb. 4,
2005).
3. Id.
4.
Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 1.
5.
Id.
6.
Bethany Carson, Code Blue, ILL. ISSUEs, Apr. 2004, at 23.
7.
Id.
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in these high-risk counties by $37,000 from $103,000 in 2002 to $140,000
in 2003.8 While insurance costs remain slightly lower for less specialized
practitioners, generalists are affected because they have nowhere to refer
patients with extraordinary needs. 9 Nursing and administrative jobs are
also lost when doctors leave. Furthermore, the influx of new medical providers is limited given that residents and recent medical school graduates
medical liability when deciding in which state they
will inevitably consider
0
should practice.'
While short-term factors in the insurance market contribute to high insurance premiums, the primary reason for the rise in premiums is that legal
trends require insurance companies to pay increased costs for malpractice
award claims." The fact that some insurance companies stopped doing
business altogether, citing expensive lawsuits, has limited competition between insurers and exacerbated the problem. Some companies, which
weathered the storm, have completely terminated writing policies in Illinois
or have limited their policies to certain geographic areas or medical specializations.
Unfortunately, the brunt of this crisis is borne by Illinois residents in
need of health care. With doctors leaving the state, patients are left with
fewer choices and opportunities. Rural areas are losing specialists and urban areas are losing medical providers in numbers that will undoubtedly
cost lives as a result of the limitations consequently forced on the health
care system. The cost borne by patients is best depicted in the widely publicized story of two Joliet neurosurgeons, who gave up brain surgery in
February, 2003, leaving the area's two hospitals bereft of head trauma
treatment.1 2 Consequently, emergency cases had to be stabilized in Joliet
forty-five minutes away to the nearest trauma center in
and transported
13
Chicago.
The intention of this article is three-fold. First, this article attempts to
bring greater attention to a growing problem that requires immediate addressing, while advocating a direct and administratively simple solution.
Second, this article seeks to provide a historical overview of caps on non-

Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting a recent AMA survey of medical
10.
students where thirty nine percent said that the medical liability environment was a factor in
their decision as to where they would like to complete residency.).
11.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Limiting Tort Liabilityfor Medical Malprac-

tice (Econ. & Budget Issue Brief, Jan. 9, 2004, at 1).
Bruce Japsen, Doctors Curtail Practices to Fight Insurance Costs, Cm. TRIB.,
12.
Feb. 16, 2003, §5.
Id.
13.
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compensatory damages relating to personal injury and, more specifically,
medical malpractice awards. Finally, and more importantly, the purpose of
this article is to provide the courts with a legal framework for re-writing its
decision to support a cap on pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice cause of actions.
Part I of this article adumbrates the current state of the medical malpractice insurance crisis in Illinois and reasons why a cap on judgments
will be most effective at controlling rising malpractice premiums, and encouraging medical providers to practice in Illinois. Part I also focuses on
the history of non-compensatory caps in Illinois, providing some insight
into the 1976 decision of Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association,14 and detailing the facts of Best v. Taylor Machine Works,' 5 the seminal case in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that caps on compensatory damages for non-economic injuries (also referred to as "noncompensatory damages" and "pain and suffering damages") violated the
Illinois Constitution's special legislation and separation of powers clauses.
Part II focuses on the court's poor reasoning in Best v. Taylor 6 and
sets forth a compelling argument for reversal. Part II not only addresses
the court's arguments pertaining to the special legislation clause and the
separation of powers clause, but it also rebuts other arguments put forward
by opponents of caps, pertaining to the right to a jury, equal protection, due
process, and the right to a certain remedy under the Illinois Constitution.
Finally, Part III concludes that the Illinois Supreme Court decision of
Best v. Taylor 17 was poorly reasoned and should be overturned, given that a
cap on non-compensatory damages for non-economic injuries in medical
malpractice actions can be supported by Illinois law and policy.
A.
ILLINOIS HEALTH CARE PROVIDER SHORTAGE AND SKYROCKETING
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEMAND IMMEDIATE

ATIENTION

While attempts at medical malpractice reformation were halted at the
end of the 2004 Illinois General Assembly session, the issue is back on the
agenda in the Illinois House and Senate as legislators reconvene in February 2005.18 In 2004, new restrictions on insurance rates and the organiza14.
Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (I11.1976).
15.
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (111. 1997).
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
The author's opinion is based on research which was primarily completed prior
to September 2004.

REEVALUATION OF BEST V. TAYLOR

20051

tion of a fund to assist in subsidizing doctors' premiums were proposed in
Senate Bill 2241 (SB2241), which died at the end of May 2004 in a thirtyseven to seventy-one vote.' 9 The bill required sixty votes to pass in the
Illinois House.27 When the legislature adjourned for the summer of 2004,
the bill was placed on the backburner. In September 2004, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich appointed former Chief Judge of Cook County, Donald P. O'Connell, to mediate reform discussions between Illinois physicians, insurance companies and trial lawyers.2 '
In February 2005, with the Illinois House and Senate reconvening, a
bipartisan reform bill was introduced. While it is unlikely that caps on
non-economic damages will be implemented by the state in the near future,
Illinois residents may see some minimal reform this year.
Initiatives which have been proposed over the years include providing
judges with greater liberty to dispose of meritless lawsuits, providing
greater controlled physician oversight and authorizing the state to decrease
unjustifiable insurance rate hikes.2 2 New restrictions on insurance rates and
the organization of a fund to assist in subsidizing doctors' premiums have
also been proposed.23
Although small-scale reform is on the table for discussion, the health
care provider shortage and skyrocketing premiums remain a problem. In
fact, on July 1, 2003, policyholders through ISMIE, Illinois' largest insurance provider, experienced a premium rate increase of 35.2% because
medical malpractice payouts climbed 59% during 2001 and 2002.24 While
the implementation of small-scale reform appears more likely than caps,
there is no evidence that small measures or a combination of small initiatives will serve to sufficiently combat the problem and result in a noticeable improvement. There is evidence, however, that states with caps on
damages for pain and suffering have not experienced the same premium
25
increases.
Kevin McDermott, Illinois House Rejects Medical Malpractice Bill, ST. LOUIS
19.
POST DISPATCH, May 28, 2004.
20. Id.
Christi Parsons, Mediator Joins Talks on Medical Insurance, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
21.
17, 2004, §2, at 3.

22.

Kevin McDermott, Illinois House Rejects Medical MalpracticeBill, ST. LOUIS

POST DISPATCH, May 28, 2004.

23. Id.
American Medical Association, AMA (Policy) Illinois: America's Medical
24.
Liability Crisis Backgrounder, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/12386.html
(last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 7 (citing OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR
25.
PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SPECIAL
UPDATE ON MED. LIABILITY CRISIS (2002) availableat
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While the dearth of physicians may go unnoticed by Chicagoans given
the myriad number of hospitals and physicians, the shortage is most visible
in Illinois' border counties where it is easy for health care providers to
traverse state borders for more affordable premiums. According to the
AMA's report on the Illinois crisis, St. Clair and Madison counties, both
just across the Mississippi River from Missouri, remain most affected. 6
Although Illinois legislators may be slow-moving towards a limitation
on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases, the crisis in Illinois may be resolved through federal legislation. President Bush has
placed tort reform at the top of his domestic agenda for his second term. In
part, he seeks a limitation on non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions. Depending on President Bush's success in his campaign for
medical malpractice reform, regardless of whether Illinois passes a cap on
non-economic damages, the state may be required to abide by a federal cap.
B.
A CAP ON NON-ECONOMIC INJURIES IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
CONTROLLING MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS

While Illinois legislators have discussed alternatives to caps 27 on noneconomic damages as a solution to the health care crisis, a cap may remain
the most effective means of controlling malpractice premiums. Although
the potential reforms may strike a balance in limiting meritless litigation
and pursuing justice in favor of those who have legitimate injuries as a result of medical malpractice, premium costs may not decrease to the same
extent as they would with the implementation of a caps limitation. If
enough reforms and the right combination are implemented, with luck,
malpractice premiums will decrease. If the reforms work to reduce the
number of lawsuits, limit jury awards or ensure enough competition in the

http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcep/reports/mlupdl.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2004)).
26.
American Medical Association, AMA (Policy) Illinois: America's Medical
Liability Crisis Backgrounder, at http://www.ama-assn.orglama/pub/category/l12386.html
(last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
27.
Some of the alternatives to a limitation on pain and suffering, which have been
advocated by lawmakers, include: limiting time patients have to file an action, limiting
venue, subsidizing malpractice costs, increasing number of insurance writers, requiring that
testifying experts practice in the same specialization as the physician under scrutiny, reforms to jury instructions, limiting frivolous suits by requiring the signature of a qualified
health care professional certifying the case's legitimacy, reforming state insurance by making agencies accountable for setting and publicizing rate increases, extending the time doctors have to switch insurance companies after rate increases, regulating the Department of
Insurance, and establishing risk management courses to establish a better report between
physicians and patients.
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insurance provider sector, malpractice premiums will inevitably decrease.
However, the simplest and most effective way to control premiums is
through the creation of a limitation. Furthermore, the success of California's Medical Injury Compensation Relief Act (MICRA) in limiting premiums cannot go unnoticed.
A study by Stanford University researchers concluded that direct reforms including caps on non-economic damages reduced the chance that a
physician will be sued by 2.1%,28 and that "within three years, premiums in
direct reform states declined by 8.4%.,,29 Another study demonstrated that
reforms, which directly reduce provider liability pressure, reduce medical
without "substantial effects on morexpenditures as much as nine percent
30
complications.
medical
or
tality
After conducting a study in which the number of physicians was compared in states with caps and without caps, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality found that "states with damage caps averaged twelve
percent more physicians per capita than states without damage caps.'
Consequently, states with a cap on pain and suffering damages in place are
more likely to provide greater access to health care for their citizens.
The efficacy of a limitation on non-economic damages is most clearly
demonstrated by examining MICRA.32 The adoption of MICRA arose out
of sky-rocketing malpractice premiums, affecting healthcare quality and
access. Although MICRA is most notably known for its $250,000 cap on
non-economic damages, other provisions include "binding arbitration on
disputes, collateral source offsets, limits on contingency fees, advance notice of malpractice claims, statute of limitations and period payment of
damages., 33 As a result of MICRA, the growth of malpractice premiums in
California has been greatly impeded. Between 1976 and 2000, malpractice

Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B.
28.
McClellan, The Effects of MalpracticePressureand Liability Reforms on Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81-106 (1997)).
Id.
29.
30. Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B.
McClellan, NAT'L BuR. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? 2
(1996), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w5466.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004)).
Id. (citing Fred Hellinger & William Encinosa, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
31.
HUMAN SERV., The Impact of State Laws Limiting MalpracticeAwards on the Geographic
Distributionof Physicians (2003)).
CAL. CIV. CODE §3333.2 (West 2003).
32.
33.

JOINT ECON. COMM. U.S. CONG., 108TH CONG., Liability for Medical Malprac-

tice: Issues & Evidence, 19 (2003) (citing John Hillman, "The Right Reforms: Experts Call
California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act a Medical-Liability Role Model,"
BEST's REv., Dec. 2002, at 49).
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premiums throughout the nation increased by 505%, while California experienced only a 167% increase. 34
The success of caps in California suggests that such reform could have
a similar effect of limiting premiums in Illinois and elsewhere. Moreover,
MICRA has brought other benefits to Californians including the expedited
settlement of claims and indemnification of the injured. Additionally, the
number of large jury awards has declined.35
The efficacy of a limitation on non-economic damages has several
important caveats: the limitation cannot be too high and it must be a hard
number. 36 If the limitation is set too high, premiums will not decrease sufficiently and the system will remain in crisis. According to the American
Medical Association, "a cap on non-economic damages that is subject to
numerous exceptions is not as effective as a hard cap like California." 37
For example, Missouri has a cap that increases with inflation.38 While it
was originally set at $350,000 in 1986, it had risen to $557,000 by February 1, 2003. 39
C.

ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

1.

Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association

In 1975 the Illinois General Assembly enacted legislation in the form
of a limitation on medical malpractice recovery to deal with the existing
medical malpractice insurance crisis. In part, the legislation provided that
the "maximum recovery on account of injuries by reason of medical, hospital or other healing art malpractice shall be $500,000. ' ,40 One year later in
the Illinois Supreme Court decision of Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital
Association, the limitation was found to violate the Illinois Constitution. 4 1
In Wright, one of the issues considered by the court was whether the
$500,000 cap on medical malpractice recovery violated the Illinois Consti-

34.
Id. (citing Lawrence E. Smarr, Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical
Litigation, Address Before a Joint Hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Feb. 11, 2003) (transcript on file with author)).
35.
Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 29.
36.
Id. at 19.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, para. 101 (1975).
41.
Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
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42
tution under the equal protection and due process clauses. The court held
that limiting recovery only in medical malpractice actions was "arbitrary"
and constituted "special legislation" in violation of section 13 of article IV
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.43 While the appellants (Central Du Page
Hospital Association and medical providers) argued that a limitation on
recovery was well founded in law, citing actions brought under the Dram
Shop Act and the Wrongful Death Statute, the court found the medical
law basis.44
malpractice limitation distinguishable because it had a common
Because the legislature created the rights and remedies available under both
acts, the court found that the authority to limit the rights and remedies
could not be questioned.4 5 The court noted that because the right to recover
damages for injuries arising under medical malpractice existed at common
law, it cannot be limited. 46 The court, however, made it clear that the limitation of a common law right and remedy was not as problematic as the fact
that the limitation was "arbitrary" in that it only limited recovery in medical malpractice actions. 47 The court was of the opinion that limiting recovery only in medical malpractice actions constituted a special law in violation of the Illinois Constitution.4 8

Although we do not hold or even imply that under no circumstances may the General Assembly abolish a common
law cause of action without a concomitant quid pro quo,
we have consistently held that to the extent that recovery is
permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis a special privilege
is granted in violation of the Illinois Constitution ....

We

are of the opinion that limiting recover only in medical
malpractice actions to $500,000 is arbitrary and constitutes
a special law in violation of section 13 of article IV of the
1970 Constitution.49
In Wright, the Illinois Supreme Court found the Public Act provision,
which limited pain and suffering recovery in medical malpractice actions to

Id. at 741.
42.
Id. at 743.
43.
Id. at 741-742 (citing Hall v. Gillins, 147 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1958); Cunningham
44.
v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. 1961)).
Id. at 742.
45.
Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
46.
Id. at 743.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. (citation omitted).
49.
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$500,000, unconstitutional in that it was arbitrary and constituted a special
50

law.

2.

Best v. Taylor Machine Works

In 1995 Illinois legislators enacted the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995.51 The act affected many areas of tort law and pertained
primarily to personal injury actions. Central to the act was the $500,000
limit on compensatory damages for non-economic injuries, codified in section 2-1115.1, which provided that:
In all common law, statutory or other actions that seek
damages on account of death, bodily injury, or physical
damage to property based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory or doctrine, recovery of noneconomic damages shall be limited to $500,000 per plain52
tiff.

The act defined non-economic damages as "damages which are intangible, including but not limited to damages for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and loss of society. 5 3
However, in 1997 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
$500,000 limit on compensatory damages for non-economic injuries was
unconstitutional in the seminal case of Best v. Taylor Machine Works.M In
Best, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 in two personal injury actions.55 The circuit court found that the eight provisions of
the act violated the Illinois Constitution--one of which was the $500,000
limit on compensatory damages for non-economic injuries.5 6 In an appeal
brought by the defendants (a railroad, an engineer and manufacturers), the
plaintiffs (an injured worker and the administrator of the estate of a second
injured worker) argued that the act violated the Illinois Constitution's special legislation clause, equal protection clause, due process clause, separa-

50.
51.

(1995).

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.

Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, P.A. 89-7, 1995
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1(a) (2002).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.2(b) (2002).

Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1106.
Id. at 1062.
Id.

fll. Laws 284-322
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57
tion of powers clause, right to a jury and right to a certain remedy. Without addressing all of the plaintiffs' arguments, the Illinois Supreme Court
found in favor of plaintiffs, holding that the compensatory damages cap
violated the constitutional prohibition against special legislation and the
separation of powers clause.58 Having determined that the cap was unconstitutional, the court found it unnecessary to consider the remaining arguments.59

11. BEST V. TAYLOR IS LACKING IN REASON AND SHOULD BE
OVERTURNED

In Best v. Taylor, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the
$500,000 cap on non-compensatory damages on the grounds that the cap
violated the special legislation clause and the separation of powers clause
of the Illinois Constitution. 60 Given that similar caps exist in other states
with comparable constitutional clauses, the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court is assailable and a future reversal may be justified under the
law. Although the Illinois Supreme Court failed to address the remainder
of the plaintiffs' arguments (that the cap violates the right to a jury, the
equal protection and due process clauses, and the right to a certain remedy),
these arguments are not impervious to rejection and are unlikely to defeat a
cap on damages for pain and suffering if re-legislated on the premises that
the special legislation and separation of powers clauses are not violated.
A.

SPECIAL LEGISLATION

The special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution provides:
"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general
law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination., 61 Under the special
legislation clause, a court must invalidate a statute that confers a benefit on
a particular group of individuals without any rational basis for neglecting
those who are not conferred the benefit. According to the Best court, sentiments in favor of the ban on special legislation have been well founded in

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081.
ILL. CONST., art. IV, § 13.
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Illinois since the 1870 Illinois Constitutional Convention. 62 In fact, notions
are so strong that the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution retained the
clause with only some modification, despite the addition of the Equal Protection and due process clauses to the Illinois Constitution, which essentially afford similar protections. 63 In Illinois, tort victims, as a class, are
evaluated under rational basis review, with respect to both the equal protection clause and the special legislation clause. Under rational basis review,
"a court must determine whether the statutory classification is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." 64 If the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the classification passes muster.
1. The Court'sAnalysis of Section 2-111.5 under the Special Legislation
Clause
In Best, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional prohibition against special legislation as "judged under the same standards
applicable to an equal protection challenge. 65 The court described the
purpose of the Special Legislation clause as designed "to prevent arbitrary
legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis." 66 The court noted that legislation is invalidated under the special legislation clause when the legislative classifications have "an artificially narrow focus .... designed primarily to confer a
benefit on a particular private group without reasonable basis, rather than to
promote the general welfare. 6 7
In Best, the plaintiffs argued that the cap arbitrarily benefited certain
tortfeasors and, in doing so, violated the special legislation clause. 68 Plaintiffs argued that the act punished the most severely injured, namely those
individuals whose pain and suffering, disfigurement and other noneconomic injuries would likely result in an award greater than $500,000.69

62.
63.
64.
1995)).
65.
(I11.1995)).
66.
(Ill. 1976)).
67.
68.
69.

Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1070.
Id.
Id. at 1071 (citing In re Petition of Vill. of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365 (111.
Id. at 1070-71 (citing In re Petition of Vill. of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365
Id. at 1069-1070 (citing Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1071.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1071.
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The court attempted to determine whether the classifications created by
section 2-1115.1 of the Act were founded upon "reasonable differences in
kind or situation, and whether the basis for the classification is sufficiently
related to the evil to be obviated by the statute."7 °
The first step of the analysis required the determination of the applicable level of scrutiny. While classifications affecting a fundamental right
or suspect class demand a greater level of scrutiny, the Best court determined that tort victims do not constitute a special class and consequently,
rational basis was employed as the proper level of review. Applying the
rational basis review test, the court held that the statutory cap on compensatory damages for non-economic losses was arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 7 1 The court found that the cap was irrational from three perspectives: it (1) irrationally discriminated between
individuals slightly and severely injured; (2) irrationally discriminated
among individuals with identical injuries; and (3) irrationally discriminated
among types of injuries.72 Furthermore, the court was unable to fathom
how the cap was rationally related to the reduction of tort liability costs.
"Even if we assume that the reduction of these undefined systemic costs is
a legitimate state interest, we do not discern how the limiting of noneconomic damages in personal injury actions may be considered rationally
related to the achievement of that interest. 73 The Best court expressed
"confusion over what constituted 'systemic costs of tort liability,' but concluded74 that whatever this interest was, it has nothing to do with damage
caps.

2.

Reanalysis of Section 2-1115.1 under the Special Legislation Clause

The court's analysis of section 2-1115.1 under the special legislation
clause has several important flaws. First, although the court describes the
applicable standard as rational basis review, the court applies what appears
to be an intermediate standard of review. In applying rational basis review,
a court should uphold a classification if any set of facts demonstrate that
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 75 The

70.
Id. (citing Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 106 N.E.2d 124 (111. 1952)).
Id. at 1077.
71.
72.
Michael J. Pollele, Best v. Taylor Machine Works: A Resounding "No" to the
Tort Reform Act, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 825, 830-31 (1998).
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1077.
73.
74.
Matthew W. Light, Note: Who's the Boss?: Statutory Damage Caps, Courts,
and State ConstitutionalLaw, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 315, 355 (Winter 2001).
Id. at 354 (citing In re Petition of Vill. of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367
75.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

Illinois Supreme Court previously recognized that an effort to remedy a
medical malpractice insurance crisis through the alteration of the statute of
limitations was a legitimate state interest. 76 Given the court's prior decision and the uncontested fact that Illinois is in the midst of the worst medical malpractice insurance crisis that the state has known, a legitimate state
interest has been established.
Furthermore, the classification established by the caps statute is rationally related to this legitimate interest. For proof, one need only consider the state of California's MICRA of 1975.77 One of MICRA's accomplishments was the implementation of a $250,000 cap on non-economic
damages. According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, while premiums in the rest of the United States have risen 569%, premiums in California have risen only 182% since 1976.78 A U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) report affirms this correlation, demonstrating
that states with caps on non-economic damages experience slower premium
rate increases than those with limited reform.79
The flaw in the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis is demonstrated by
the fact that other states, including Maryland and Virginia, have applied the
same level of review to this issue and have come to the opposite conclusions. In evaluating a caps statute under the special legislation clause, and
also applying rational basis, the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the caps were rationally related to the
states' goals. "The Supreme Court of Virginia opined that the cap might
bring down insurance premiums and alleviate the difficulty medical providers experienced in obtaining insurance. Similarly, the Maryland Court
of Appeals found that the cap 80might lead to reduced premiums and attract
insurers back into the market.
Given the heightened medical malpractice insurance crisis, the State
of Illinois is in desperate need of immediate and drastic reform; clearly a
legitimate state interest exists. The existence of the GAO report alone is
enough to establish that the implementation of a cap on non-economic
damages is rationally related to a slower growth rate of insurance premiums, which would undoubtedly improve our crisis. That aside, the fact that
several other states have found that their special legislation clauses are not
violated by a cap on non-economic damages demonstrates that differences

(Ill. 1995)).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 368 (citing Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d 560, 570, 572 (111. 1979)).
CAL. CIV. CODE §3333.2 (2003).
Liability Reform, supra note 1, at 28.
Id. at 34-35.
Light, supra note 74, at 354.
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in opinion can exist among reasonable minds. Should the state of Illinois
wish to implement a cap on non-economic damages, the special legislation
clause would not be violated.
B.

SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE

The Separation of Powers Clause of the Illinois Constitution provides:
"The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch
shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."8 In Best, plaintiffs
argued, in part, that section 2-1115.1 violated the Separation of Powers
Clause by "improperly delegating to the legislature the power of remitting
verdicts and judgments, which is a power unique to the judiciary. 8 2 Remittitur is a procedure whereby a judge may order the reduction of a damage award with the plaintiff's consent, or he may order a new trial if the
plaintiff does not agree with the reduction. Essentially, the plaintiffs
claimed that the cap infringed on the authority of the courts to evaluate the
excessiveness or lack thereof of a jury's award on a case-by-case basis.83
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that 2-1115.1 infringed upon the
power of the judiciary, reasoning that "courts are constitutionally empowered, and indeed obligated, to reduce excessive verdicts where appropriate
in light of the evidence adduced in a particular case," and that the cap on
non-economic damages "reduces damages by operation of law, without
regard to the specific circumstances of individual jury awards. 84
1.

Caps are a Limit on Recovery and Not a Barrierto Judicial Remittitur

The court's argument in Best, that a limit on non-economic damages
robs the courts of a judicial function, is deeply flawed. While a cap on
non-economic damages would place a limit on the award for non-economic
injuries which a plaintiff could seek, the judiciary is by no means left bereft
of its traditional power of remittitur. In fact, the Best appellants offer a
more accurate characterization of the results in describing the caps as "an
outer parameter by which wholly subjective damages are limited. 85 The
Illinois Supreme Court expressed concerns that an excessive award would

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

ILL. CONST., art. II, § 1.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078.
Id.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1078.
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be left unchecked without the judiciary's power of remittitur.86 However,
one of the purposes of the cap on non-economic damages is to prevent excessive awards. Through a cap on all non-economic damages the potential
for excessive awards would be greatly limited. Furthermore, the judiciary
would retain its power of remittitur to adjust awards as necessary within the
sphere allowed by the caps. The Illinois Supreme Court stressed that remittitur must be applied on a case-by-case basis with the examination of evidence unique to every case in support of a jury award. 7 However, this
would not change. The courts would retain the power of remittitur and the
ability to apply it on a case-by-case basis. The only consequence of the
caps would be that there would be a ceiling on the amount of damages for
non-economic injuries which a plaintiff could ask for prior to the jury's
decision. Once a jury award is returned, the judiciary would retain its
power of remittitur to adjust the award as necessary so long as the cap is
not exceeded.
2.

Legislature has Purview over Issues of Policy

The Illinois Supreme Court stressed the importance of protecting the
separation of powers clause with respect to the judiciary, but let us not forget that the role of the legislature must also be protected. It is the role of
the legislature to evaluate and determine issues of public policy. In fact,
the legislature is better suited for doing so. It is the judiciary's role to administer the law. The enactment of legislation, which establishes a cap on
non-economic damages, is an acceptable move by the Illinois Legislature.
The Legislature has access to myriad resources and data and has the responsibility to make policy determinations. It is important to remember
that the cap is largely premised on concerns for access to medical treatment
and the availability of affordable medical malpractice insurance for physicians-two grave public concerns. As summed up by the American Medical Association, "[d]amage caps88are questions of policy, properly within
the legislature's scope of power.,

86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1080.
Id.
LiabilityReform, supra note 4, at 28.
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C.
A CAP ON NONCOMPENSATORY DAMAGES DOES NOT IMPAIR EQUAL
PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, NOR DOES IT IMPAIR RIGHTS TO A
CERTAIN REMEDY OR TO A JURY

Because the Illinois Supreme Court found that 2-1115.1 violated the
Illinois Constitution's separation of powers and special legislation clauses,
the court declined to address the appellees' arguments that the legislation
also violated the right to a jury trial and the right to a certain remedy under
the Illinois Constitution. While the court offered no opinion on these arguments, it is important to offer an analysis herein, as opponents of limits
on non-economic awards attempt to substantiate their arguments by focusing on these rights. At this time it is also important to address equal protection and due process rights, given that opponents have also argued that a
cap encroaches on these rights.
1.

Equal Protectionand Due Process

Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution provides: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor
be denied the equal protection of the laws., 89 The equal protection analysis
is essentially identical to the analysis under the special legislation clause.
"A special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge." 90 Once again, the court
must determine the applicable level of scrutiny. In Best, the court correctly
stated that Public Act 89-7 did not affect a fundamental right or involve a
quasi-suspect or suspect class. 91 Consequently, the court correctly noted
that the appropriate standard of review was rational basis. 92 "Under this
standard, a court must determine whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate State interest., 93 If the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, then the law must be
upheld.
In Best, the court applied a heightened standard of review in its analysis of the statute under the special legislation clause. While the court stated
that rational basis was the appropriate test, the court applied something

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
1995)).

ILL.CONST., art. I, §2.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1070.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Petition of Vill. of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367-68 (Ill.
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more along the lines of an intermediate review. The Best decision has a
poor basis in law and reason. First, the court was unable to understand
"'how the limiting of noneconomic damages in personal injury actions may
be considered rationally related' to attempts to reduce liability costs." 94
Second, the court could not identify a legitimate state interest in support of
the damage cap.95 The court ignored the legislature's interest in reducing
tort liability costs, expressing confusion over "systematic costs of tort liability," and concluded that the legislature's interest had nothing to do with
damage caps. 96 The court's reasoning and conclusions are counterintuitive.
As stated in Village of Vernon Hills:
If any set of facts can be reasonably conceived that justifies
distinguishing the class to which the statute applies from
the class to which the statute is inapplicable, then the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons and
objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control,
and may enact laws applicable only to those persons or objects.97
Thus, if any set of facts can justify the classification as furthering a legitimate state interest, the legislation is not in violation of the Illinois equal
protection clause.
Similarly, a cap on non-compensatory damages cannot be struck down
by the due process clause. As in the equal protection analysis, the level of
scrutiny must first be determined. Ifno fundamental right, suspect class or
quasi-suspect class is involved, the proper standard of review is rational
basis. The statute must have a rational basis to a legitimate state interest.
Applying the same reasoning of the equal protection analysis, the due process argument can be dismissed.

94.
1057, 1077
95.
96.
97.

Light, supra note 75, at 354 (quoting Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d
(I11.
1997)).
Id. at 355.
Id.
In re Petition of Vill. of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ill. 1995).
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Right to a Jury

Many opponents of damage caps have based their arguments on the
grounds that a cap violates the right to a trial by jury. The Seventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which codifies this right, provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.98

While the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, many
states have adopted and incorporated similar provisions into their state constitutions. For example, the Illinois Constitution provides that "[t]he right
of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." 99 Right to
jury arguments turn primarily on the role of the jury in different phases of a
civil trial.
Opponents of medical malpractice non-compensatory caps argue that
damages in medical malpractice actions are factual determinations that
should be made by a jury, and the removal of this determination from the
jury violates the right to trial by jury. In Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., the
Oregon Supreme Court found a statutory cap on damages to be unconstitutional, reasoning "that the assessment of damages was a factual determination and a function of a common law jury at the time the Oregon constitution was adopted in 1851. ° The Lakin reasoning is consistent with decisions of other courts, finding that caps violate a right to trial by jury.
Many courts, however, have upheld caps over trial by jury challenges.
For example, in Pulliamv. Coastal Emergency Services of Richmond, Inc.,
the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a medical malpractice cap.101 The court
noted that a jury's fact-finding function includes the assessment of damages and that it is the court's duty to apply the law to the facts with the
remedy being an applicable part of the law.102 The court reasoned, how-

98.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
99.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
100.
Kevin J. Gfell, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a National
Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical MalpracticeActions, 37 IND. L. REV. 773, 784
(2004) (citing Lakin v. Senco Prod. Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 468-75 (Or. 1993)).
101.
Id. at 785 (citing Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509
S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999)).
102.
Id. at 312.
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the jury has
ever, that because a trial court applies the caps limitation after
103
infringed.
not
is
jury
by
trial
to
right
the
damages,
assessed
Given that the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is similar
to the Illinois provision, examining federal case law may provide a basis
for an Illinois approach. In Dimick v. Schiedt, the Supreme Court averred
that the assessment of damages was a function of a jury."14 However, in
Tull v. U.S., the court found that a jury's determination of a civil penalty
was not a "fundamental element" of the seventh amendment. 10 5 In Boyd v.
Bulala, the 4th Circuit Appellate Court opined that, "[i]t is not the role of
the jury to determine the legal consequences of its factual finding.., that is
a matter for the legislature."' 1 6 As noted by Kevin Gfell, some compelling
language in support of this emerged in the1071989 District Court of Maryland
decision, Franklinv. Mazda Motor Corp.
Juries always find facts on a matrix of laws given to them
by the legislature and by precedent, and it can be hardly
argued that limitations imposed by law are a usurpation of
the jury function ....The power of the legislature to define, augment, or even abolish complete causes of action
must necessarily include the power to define by statute
what damages may be recovered by a litigant with a particular cause of action ....Particularly in the area of damages for pain and suffering, the legislature acts within its
power in creating reasonable limits on the causes of action
damages it chooses to allow in the courts
and recoverable
108
law.
of
In Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Ryan, an Illinois appellate case from the
First District, a car rental company sought a declaratory judgment that a
statute which mandated that the advertised price of a rental car include all
costs, and which placed a cap on damages a company could receive from a
driver for negligent damage to a rental car, was unconstitutional. 109 The
statute imposed a $200 cap on the amount of damages that a car rental

103.
Richmond,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Gfell, supra note 100, at 786 (citing Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of
Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999)).
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (1935).
Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987).
Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
Gfell, supra note 100, at 787-88.
Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331-32 (D. Md. 1989).
Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Ryan, 643 N.E.2d 1345 (Iil. App. Ct. 1994).
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company may recover from a driver for negligently causing damage to a
rental car. I 0 One of the issues considered by the court was whether the cap
on damages violated the right to a jury trial under the Illinois Constitution.' In holding that the statute did not violate the Illinois Constitution's
right to trial by jury, the court reasoned:
Before the right to a jury trial is implicated, there must be
an issue of fact to be determined. (Departmentof Revenue
v. Steacy (1967), 38 Ill.2d 581, 232 N.E.2d 743.) By precluding any award above the $200 cap, the statute as a matter of law eliminates any factual 1controversy
concerning
2
amount.'
that
of
excess
in
damages
The court then went on to quote Boyd v. Bulala:
"True, it is the role of the jury as factfinder to determine
the extent of a plaintiffs injuries ... however, it is not the
role of the jury to determine the legal consequences of its
factual findings. (citation omitted) That is a matter for the
legislature, and here, the Virginia legislature has decided
that as a matter of law damages in excess of [the cap] are
not relevant.., once the jury has made its findings of fact
with respect to damages, it has fulfilled its constitutional
function; it may not also mandate compensation as a matter
of law." (877 F.2d at 1196.) The court therefore determined that the statute
was constitutional. We reach the
13
same result here.
In holding that the $200 cap did not violate the right to a jury and in
relying so heavily on Boyd v. Bulala, it is clear that the First District Appellate Court follows the line of reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court in
Pulliam-thatit is the court's duty to apply the law to the facts and that a
cap on the remedy is simply part of the law.' 1 4 Similarly, should a right to
jury trial argument be presented in opposition to a cap on noncompensatory damages in medical malpractice cause of actions, it should
be dismissed under the analysis that the right is not violated because the
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limitation is applied by the court after the jury has completed its job of assessing damages.
D.

RIGHT TO A CERTAIN REMEDY

While not addressed in the court's opinion, the appellees in Best v.
Taylor alleged that Public Act 89-7 violated the right to a certain remedy
outlined in the Illinois Constitution." 5 Illinois' Constitution provides:
"Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
'' 16
wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation.
In holding that the cap violated the constitutional prohibition against special legislation and the separation of powers clause, the court declined to
that the decision
address the right to a certain remedy argument, given
7
findings."
court's
the
of
outcome
the
affect
not
would
Without even examining the right to a certain remedy issue and in a
different context, the court did note that article I, section 12 serves more as
a statement of philosophy than a right: "[T]hough article I, section 12 does
not create a constitutional right to a certain remedy, it expresses a general
statement of philosophy."'" 8 The Best court cited Sergers v. Industrial
Commission,119 another Illinois Supreme Court case, in making this statement.
In Cunningham v. Brown, a widow brought an action against a tavern
owner for the death of her husband who became intoxicated at the tavern
and then committed suicide out of despondency. 20 One issue considered
by the court was whether Article VI of the Liquor Control Act provides the
only remedy against the tavern owner and operator for an injury suffered
by an intoxicated person.' 2' The widow wanted the court to recognize a
common law remedy in addition to the remedy under the Liquor Control
Act, and thus allow her to bring several causes of action.122 The court held
that the Liquor Control Act provided the only remedy. 23 The court rea-
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123.

Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1063.
ILL. CONST. art. I, §12.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081.
Id. at 1111 (Miller, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Sergers v. Indus. Comm'n, 732 N.E.2d 488, 497 (111. 2000).
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soned that the existence of a legislative remedy, albeit limited,
24 does not
require the courts to recognize another more expansive remedy. 1
Similarly, any argument based on the right to a certain remedy provision in the Illinois Constitution will not stand. First of all, the right to a
certain remedy is not violated. Applying the reasoning of Cunningham, the
existence of a legislative remedy, limited by caps, does not require that the
court offer another remedy or designate the remedy limited by the caps as
in violation of the Illinois Constitution. Furthermore, as stated by the Illinois Supreme Court, article I, section 12 is "an expression of a philosophy"
and not a mandate that a remedy exist in a certain form.1 25 Should this argument be brought forth in the future in opposition to a cap on noncompensatory damages, any Illinois court will likely find it non-compelling
and uphold the cap.
III. CONCLUSION

Medical liability reform will remain an issue of great importance and
will continue to stir discussion and debate in Illinois until lawmakers reach
an agreement. Rising malpractice premiums in Illinois must be controlled
in order for the state to retain qualified health care providers. If premiums
continue to increase, Illinois will not only experience a shortage in medical
professionals, but competition among providers will also abate, leaving
residents with fewer options, fewer opportunities and sub-par services. As
Economics 101 teaches, competition is good for the market. Competition
among physicians promotes strong work ethics and optimal patient service
and health care, while controlling costs. With fewer health care providers
as a result of the rising costs to practice in Illinois, competition will diminish and health care services will be less available. Patients may find that
available services are not of the same quality as those received in the past.
With little professional competition and a smaller number of physicians
responsible for a greater number of patients, the health care crisis may escalate into a disaster.
Given the significance of this problem, a cap on pain and suffering
damages in medical malpractice awards offers the most effective and administratively simple solution, as evidenced through the enforcement of
California's MICRA. While the Illinois Supreme Court maintains that caps
are unconstitutional, the court's reasoning in Best remains illogical and

124.
1989).
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See also Stevens v. Lou's Lemon Tree, Ltd., 543 N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ill. App. Ct.
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contrived. Should the membership of the Illinois Supreme Court change,
the issue of caps could be revisited and the court may conclude that caps on
pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice actions are constitutional.
Having examined the various arguments put forward by cap opponents and having scrutinized the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning in
Best, it is clear that a reversal of Best could be justified under Illinois law.
However, in further support of a limitation on pain and suffering damages
in medical malpractice cases, policy must be considered. The professionalism and general integrity of health care providers supports such a cap.
Medical injuries arising out of faulty medical procedures or the accident of
a health care provider are distinguishable from injuries arising out of automobile actions or other personal injury actions. From the very first patientphysician encounter, the relationship is generally premised on the patient's
best interest and well-being. A patient arrives at a hospital seeking care,
treatment or a check-up. Any surgery or procedure initiated is done so with
the best interests of the patient foremost in mind. In fact, medical care may
be defined as the remedying of physical problems and illnesses or the preservation of the health or physical condition of an individual. Other torts are
not furnished with the same background where the tort victim's best interest was the original focus of the interaction or the foundation of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Because it can be assumed that
physicians and health care providers have the best interests of their patient
in mind, medical malpractice liability should be entitled to slightly different
standards. Because physicians can no longer afford to practice in Illinois
due to rising premiums, the priorities of Illinois residents must be reevaluated. A cap on pain and suffering damages in medical malpractice cases,
allowing patients unlimited compensatory damages without curtailing the
availability of punitive damages, does not seem so bad when one considers
the alternatives. The alternatives being the depletion of physicians
throughout Illinois, the lack of specialists in many areas of the state, resulting in travel and prolonging the time before one can receive emergency
care, and the lack of competition in the medical care profession.
With all-time high medical malpractice insurance premiums driving
doctors out of the state in search of lower premiums, reform is certainly on
the table for discussion. While it is probable that a multitude of small-scale
measures will first be employed by the state, the success of such a multifaceted solution will be limited. Rather, the implementation of a direct and
simple solution like caps will prove to be what Illinois requires in the face
of the current crisis. If the issue of caps for pain and suffering damages
eventually reappears before the highest court of the State of Illinois, and
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given enough of an impetus demanding that the court reevaluate its decision, the court could justify a reversal under Illinois law.

